Economics and Development
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Assistant Professor Michael Dorsch recently co-authored an article in Public Choice exploring an alternative explanation for political instability in autocracies. In their model, Dorsch and his colleagues Karl Dunz and Paul Maarek demonstrate that adverse macroeconomic shocks are more likely to lead to mass political protests and revolutionary activity in regimes that impose restrictive regulations on the private sector.
In a public lecture at the School of Public Policy on February 12, Boston University PhD candidate Amrit Amirapu presented his research (joint with Michael Gechter) on the costs of labor regulation in India. Amirapu argued that certain regulations have led to distortions in firm sizes and a misallocation of resources between more productive and less productive firms. The data had significant variation by state, industry, and ownership type due to corruption and poor state implementation.
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